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A COMMENDABLE GOAL: PUBLIC POLICY
AND THE FATE OF SPOUSAL SUPPORT
AFTER 1996
I. INTRODUCTION
When one thinks of a contemporary marriage, chances are one
pictures two working individuals sharing the financial responsibilities
of running a household.! Since the 1960s, women have made a num-
ber of milestone accomplishments, particularly in the workforce.'
Naturally, with such evolvement the marital dynamic changes as well.
The perception of the past is that one spouse, usually the wife, sacri-
ficed her career for childrearing and social responsibilities connected
to her husband's job.' Or, perhaps, she sacrificed further education
to take a job that provided financial support while her husband at-
tained a professional degree.4 Either way, the wife was usually the
1. In the traditional American family, the roles of husband and wife, and for
that matter mother and father, were such that the husband provided the financial
support for the family while the wife took care of the house and children. With
the advent of the modem American family, however, this traditional assumption
has been replaced by the two paycheck family; instead of the husband being the
sole provider of financial support, both spouses are now contributing to the
needs of the family. See Peter Nash Swisher, Reassessing Fault Factors in No-
Fault Divorce, 31 FAM. L.Q. 269, 276-78 (1997).
2. As for women's participation in the workforce, a number of factors can
be credited with the upsurge, including: "(1) more effective means of birth con-
trol and the trend toward fewer children; (2) the increased life expectancy of
women; (3) the greater number of college-educated women; and (4) the wide-
spread use of labor-saving devices in the home." EDITORIAL RESEARCH
REPORTS ON THE WOMEN'S MOVEMENT: ACHmvEMENTS AND EF-Ecrs ON THE
WOMEN'S MOVEMENT 25 (Hoyt Gimlin ed. 1977) [hereinafter EDITORIAL
RESEARCH REPORTS ON THE WOMEN'S MOVEMENT].
3. See Swisher, supra note 1, at 277.
4. See, e.g., Joan Williams, Is Coverture Dead? Beyond a New Theory of
Alimony, 82 GEo. L.J. 2227, 2267-79 (discussing the treatment of wive's claims to
their husbands' professional degrees in marital dissolution proceedings); Susan
Klebanoff, Comment, To Love and Obey 'Til Graduation Day-The Professional
Degree in Light of the Uniform Marital Property Act, 34 AM. U. L. REv. 839
(1985) (analyzing whether a professional degree attained by a husband is consid-
ered property in marital dissolution proceedings).
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one foregoing her career in favor of domestic duties. Today, how-
ever, more and more women are seeking their own professional ca-
reers rather than stepping into the role of full-time housewife or
mother."
Women's increased participation in the workforce has altered
the ways in which courts look at the alimony, or spousal support, is-
sue in marital dissolution proceedings. To gain a perspective on this
issue, consider that between 1980 and 1994 there were approximately
2.3 million marriages per year in the United States.6 Unfortunately,
there were in excess of 1.1 million divorces per year for that same
time period In California alone that number exceeded 100 thousand
per year.'
In assessing spousal support in marital dissolution proceedings,
California courts consider a variety of factors enumerated in Family
Code section 4320.' These factors include each spouse's need, the du-
ration of the marriage, and the age and health of the parties."0 While
spousal support is not mandatory, the Family Code requires courts to
weigh each of these factors against the marital standard of living, and
each spouse's respective needs and abilities." Yet, because each case
5. See EDITORIAL RESEARCH REPORTS ON THE WOMEN'S MOVEMENT, su-
pra note 2, at 6-7.
In the 1970s, the percentage of women electing to forego children increased,
whereas women who chose to have children were doing so later in life. See Elaine
Tyler May, Myths & Realities of the American Family, in 5 A HISTORY OF
PRIVATE LIFE 539, 583 (Antoine Prost & Gerard Vincent eds., Arthur Gold-
hammer, trans., 1991). Furthermore, in the late 1980s, over 66% of children, ages
3-4 years old, were in daycare or nursery school. See id. at 587.
6. See U.S. BUREAU OF THE CENSUS, STATISTICAL ABSTRACT OF THE
UNITED STATES: 1996 107, No. 153 (116th ed. 1996) [hereinafter STATISTICAL
ABSTRACT].
7. See id.
8. See id. According to the Statistical Abstract, the number of divorces in
California for 1994 "[r]epresents or rounds to zero." Id.
9. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 4320 (West 1994 & Supp. 1998)(formerly CAL.
CIV. CODE § 4801(a)(1)-(10)).
10. See id. § 4320(d),(f),(h).
11. See id. § 4330(a) (West Supp. 1998) (formerly CAL. CIV. CODE § 4801(a)).
The section states:
(a) In a judgment of dissolution of marriage... the court may order a party to
pay for the support of the other party an amount... that the court determines is
just and reasonable, based on the standard of living established during the mar-
riage, taking into consideration the circumstances as provided in Chapter 2




presents a myriad of facts and circumstances, the legislature specifi-
cally gives courts broad discretion in determining spousal support."
Thus, while judges are not obligated to give any one factor more
weight than another, they are nonetheless expected to engage in an
ad hoc balancing process to achieve an equitable result.
In 1996 the California legislature passed Senate Bill 509 (SB 509
or 1996 Amendments) to amended sections 4320 and 4330 of the
Family Code. 3 The authors of SB 509 sought to align existing law
with current trends regarding divorced women in the workforce.14
Towards this end, the authors felt the need to eliminate section
4320's tone towards supported spouses, finding that the current law
"discourage[d] self-sufficiency and encourage[d] dependency."15
First, SB 509 created several new provisions for section 4320,
subdivisions (j) and (k). 6 Of the two, subsection (k) has incited the
most controversy because it codifies California's public policy goal
that a supported spouse become self-supporting within a reasonable
amount of time." For purposes of the statute, the legislature defined
"reasonable period of time" as generally half the duration of the
marriage. While the statute does not define "self-supporting," it
tends to mean the ability to support oneself at a level close to that
existing during the marriage.19 In addition, since courts consider
12. See WILLIAM P. HOGOBOOM & DONALD B. KING, CALIFORNIA
PRACriCE GUIDE: FAMILY LAW 6-214.4 (1997) [hereinafter PRACtICE GUIDE].
13. See SB 509, 1995-96 Reg. Sess., 1996 Cal. Stat. ch. 1163, § 1.
14. See CALIFORNIA AssEMBLY COMM. ON JUD., REPORT ON SB 509, JUNE
19, 1996 HEARING, 1995-96 Reg. Sess. 3-4 [hereinafter JUNE 1996 REPORT ON SB
509]. According to committee reports, as of 1992 over 60% of divorced mothers
were in the labor force, most of them holding down full-time jobs. See id. Pro-
ponents of SB 509 relied on statistics provided by the U.S. Department of Labor.
15. Id. at 4.
16. See CAL. FAM. CODE §§ 4320(j)-(i) (West Supp. 1998).
17. The provision states:
The goal that the supported party shall be self-supporting within a
reasonable period of time. A "reasonable period of time" for
purposes of this section generally shall be one-half the length of the
marriage. However, nothing in this section is intended to limit the
court's discretion to order support for a greater or lesser length of
time, based on any of the other factors listed in this section and the
circumstances of the parties.
Id. § 4320(k).
18. See id.
19. According to Professor Joan Krauskopf, "Self-sufficiency connotes more
than subsistence or partial support. The dependent recipient is declared self-
sufficient when it is fair to require her alone to bear the entire remaining gap be-
tween income and reasonable needs." Joan M. Krauskopf, Rehabilitative Ali-
mony: Uses and Abuses of Limited Duration Alimony, 21 FAM. L.Q. 573, 583
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other section 4320 factors in light of the marital standard of living,
there is no reason to believe this factor should not be similarly
treated.20
Second, the 1996 Amendments created a new subdivision to sec-
tion 4330 as well. Originally, section 4330 contained only one provi-
sion, a provision that allowed a court to order one party to pay sup-
port to the other for whatever time the court deemed just and
reasonable in light of section 4320's factors.2' The new subdivision of
section 4330 also codifies the public policy goal of self-support; it
gives courts the discretion to consider a supported spouse's failure to
make good faith efforts to become self-supporting as a change of cir-
cumstances sufficient to warrant modification or termination of
spousal support.2
On February 20, 1997, Assembly Bill 400 (AB 400), sponsored
by the Coalition for Family Equity, was introduced, Numerous
women's groups, including the National Organization for Women
(NOW) and California Women Lawyers joined in support of the
bill.2 Authors of the bill sought to clarify SB 509 and remedy what
they termed "anti-female" legislation.2' AB 400 addressed three
things: (1) that "self-supporting" should relate to the marital standard
of living; (2) that marriages of long duration should be exempt from
the self-supporting objective of section 4320(k); and (3) that courts
should have discretion to warn a supported spouse to become self-
sufficient under section 4330.' In addition, the authors of AB 400
(1988).
20. See PRACriCE GUIDE, supra note 12, at 6-244.
21. Compare CAL. FAM. CODE § 4330 (West 1994), with CAL. FAM. CODE §
4330(a) (West Supp. 1998) (illustrating the changes to the statute following the
enactment of SB 509).
22. Section 4330(b) reads as follows:
It is the goal of this state that each party shall make reasonable good
faith efforts to become self-supporting as provided for in Section 4320.
The failure to make reasonable good faith efforts, may be one of the
factors considered by the court as a basis for modifying or terminating
support.
Id.
23. See Complete Bill History: AB 400-Kuebi, reprinted in 2 ASSEMBLY
WEEKLY HISTORY 289, 314 (Feb. 6, 1998) [hereinafter Complete Bill History of
AB 400].
24. See CALIFORNIA ASSEMBLY COMM. ON JUD., REPORT ON AB 400, MAY
20, 1997 HEARING, 1997-98 Reg. Sess. 10 [hereinafter MAY 1997 REPORT ON AB
400]. The bill was supported by over a dozen womens' groups, comprising the
professional, political, and religious arenas. See id.
25. Telephone Interview with Joanne Schulman, co-author of AB 400 (Sept:
25, 1997) [hereinafter Telephone Interview].
26. See MAY 1997 REPORT ON AB 400, supra note 24, at 1.
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wanted to cure the alleged contradiction the 1996 Amendments cre-
ated with section 4336.2 Section 4336 governs a court's retention of
jurisdiction over spousal support in long-term marriages.' Since sec-
tions 4320(k) and 4330 now codify the public policy goal of self-
support within half the duration of the marriage, AB 400 supporters
argue that long-term marriages are no longer protected under section
4336.29 Although AB 400 went through numerous committee hear-
ings in both the Assembly and the Senate,3 Governor Pete Wilson
vetoed the bill on September 8, 1997, on the grounds that it incor-
rectly assumed the 1996 Amendments required courts to automati-
cally terminate spousal support after half the duration of the mar-
riage.3"
This Comment explores the interplay of Family Code section
4320 with sections 4330 and 4336 by analyzing both statutory and de-
cisional authority. In light of this interplay, this Comment argues
that the revisionist perspective of AB 400 is unnecessary because cur-
rent law adequately protects the displaced homemaker. Since a basic
understanding of California family law is necessary to the following
analysis, Part II discusses divorce law prior to 1970, the ultimate re-
moval of marital fault from dissolution proceedings, and the effects
of no-fault divorce on spousal support. Part III revisits the argu-
ments of both SB 509 and AB 400 to map out the views of each camp
to ensure a better understanding of the debate. Part IV focuses on
the specific changes of SB 509 and applies them to the concerns
voiced in AB 400, arguing that the displaced homemaker is indeed
protected.
27. Telephone Interview, supra note 25. See also MAY 1997 REPORT ON AB
400, supra note 24, at 7 (stating that the purpose of the bill is to resolve contra-
dictions in the Family Code caused by the 1996 Amendments).
28. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 4336 (West 1994) (formerly CAL. CIV. CODE §
4801(d)).
29. See MAY 1997 REPORT ON AB 400, supra note 24, at 1.
30. Hearings on AB 400 commenced on February 20, 1997, and ended with
submission to Governor Wilson on August 27, 1997. See Complete Bill History
on AB 400, supra note 23, at 314.
31. See Letter from Pete Wilson, Governor of California, to the California
Assembly (Sept. 8, 1997), reprinted in 139 AssEMBLY DAILY FILE 54 (1998)
(vetoing AB 400) [hereinafter Letter from Pete Wilson].
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II. DIVORCE REFORM
A. Social Changes: The Feminist Movement and Women in the
Workforce
A number of social changes are credited with reforming divorce
in the latter half of this century. Although longer life-spans and
smaller families contributed to reshaping the concept of "family," the
feminist movement and women's ever-growing participation in the
workforce are perhaps the most significant changes."
During the 1960s and 1970s there was a strong drive by women
to gain legal equality with men.33 For instance, in California, the Fair
Employment Housing Act (FEHA) deemed sex a protected subclass,
thereby shielding women from employment discrimination.m In 1971,
the California Supreme Court declared sex a suspect class subject to
strict scrutiny under equal protection.35 On a national level, Title VII
of the Civil Rights Act of 196436 outlawed sex discrimination, and the
Equal Rights Amendment was at the forefront of social and political
discourseY
Since the feminist movement is more popularly connected with
political battles, 3 its effects on divorce are less apparent. For in-
stance, the feminist movement had a trickle-down effect on the fam-
ily ideal and the traditional woman's role within society. The femi-
nist rhetoric of equality played a large part in reforming the concept
of marriage into a partnership of equals rather than a lifetime con-
tract premised on the traditional male-dominated view.39 As for the
married woman, the feminist mantra of independence translated into
economic terms, or the need for women to take responsibility for
their own financial independence.' With regard to divorce, feminists
32. See HERBERT JACOB, SILENT REVOLUTION: THE TRANSFORMATION OF
DIVORCE LAW IN THE UNITED STATES 16-29 (1988). For example, Jacob notes
that in 1900 the average life span for women was 48 years, as compared to 78
years in 1980. See id. at 16.
33. For a brief discussion of legal equality, see Herma Hill Kay, An Appraisal
of California's No-Fault Divorce Law, 75 CAL. L. REv. 291, 302 (1987).
34. See CAL. Gov'T CODE § 12921 (West 1992).
35. See Sail'er Inn v. Kirby, 5 Cal. 3d 1, 17, 485 P.2d 529, 539, 95 Cal. Rptr.
329, 339 (1971).
36. See 42 U.S.C. § 2000e-2 (1994).
37. See M. MARGARET CONWAY ET. AL., WOMEN & PUBLIC POLICY: A
REVOLUTION IN PROGRESS 5-9 (1995).
38. See id. at 7.




saw little problem with transitional, or rehabilitative, alimony as a
way of assisting women in the transition from housewife to working
woman without strapping her to an unsavory stereotype." As author
Herbert Jacob noted in Silent Revolution:
Most feminists in the 1960s and 1970s did not perceive any
problem with transforming alimony (which presumed a
continuing obligation of a husband to support his ex-wife
until another man took up the responsibility) into a
temporary and transitional maintenance payment, designed
to allow a woman to take up the responsibility of caring for
herself independently.
Women's ever-increasing participation in the workforce-one
result of feminists urging women to take a more active role in their
financial well-being-significantly shaped the way divorce is per-
ceived today. With employment, women embraced the feminist ideal
of economic independence and, as a result, their financial depend-
ence on men eroded. By the 1980s women worked in a wide range of
occupations, including high-salaried professions traditionally re-
served for men. Moreover, from 1970 to 1990, the number of
women participating in the workforce has increased at a rate greater
than males."
B. Legal Changes: A Shift to No-Fault Divorce
In 1970 California took a bold step by becoming the first state to
eliminate fault as a prerequisite for divorce.4 Historically, for one to
obtain a divorce, he or she had to prove that the other spouse com-
mitted a marital offense. A showing of adultery or some form of
mental or physical cruelty satisfied this requisite fault.' Yet, com-
plaints of mere insolence or disagreeable character were insuffi-
cient.47 In short, courts were not to be viewed as providing "cures for
all the miseries of human life." 4
41. See id. at 23-24.
42. Id. at 24.
43. See id. at 18.
44. See STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 6, at 395, No. 617.
45. See Family Law Act of 1969, 1969 Cal. Stat. 3312, 3323-30, ch. 1608, § 8,
title 3 (repealed).
46. See Ovvie Miller, California Divorce Reform After 25 Years, 28 BEVERLY
HILLS B. Ass'N J. 160, 161 (1994).
47. See id. at 160 (discussing Waldron v. Waldron, 85 Cal. 251, 24 P. 649
(1890)). In Waldron, the California Supreme Court reversed an alimony order
because it felt that a husband's rude language was not cruel enough to constitute
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As women altered their role in society, divorce reformers fo-
cused on the acrimonious nature of fault-based laws and rallied for
change. The top reformers were not politicians, but rather a select
group of lawyers, professors, judges, and psychiatrists arguing for re-
form based on professional experiences with the fault-based regime.49
The no-fault agenda was the product of seven years of study and de-
bate, and the themes that emerged were as varied as their support-
ers. For instance, some no-fault supporters felt that removing fault
would reduce the divorce rate and reinforce the family." Others
viewed divorce as an inevitable result of marital-relation breakdown
and that, by removing fault, the divorce process would not be mired
in hypocrisy. 2 Yet, regardless of these disparate expectations, most
shared the common view that eliminating marital fault was necessary
for the good of the public.53
Ultimately, the latter theme was the principal unifying factor for
most reformers. As Herma Hill Kay, a key reformer and law profes-
sor, stated, "One of [the California reform effort's] major goals, and
its most enduring achievement, was to free the administration of jus-
tice in divorce cases from the hypocrisy and perjury that had resulted
from the use of marital fault as a controlling consideration in divorce
proceedings."' 4 This approach identified several problems, namely,
that the requirement of fault turned divorce proceedings into an ad-
versarial process. Fault forced spouses to resort to finger-pointing,
while judges found themselves hosts to hotel detectives and public
displays of private investigator work product.5  Mudslinging and
sordid-detailed accounts were common repartee in the courtroom.
56
Often, a showing of fault necessitated fraudulent testimony to
disguise a husband and wife's mutual agreement to divorce.57
fault. See Waldron, 85 Cal. at 265, 24 P. at 653.
48. Miller, supra note 46, at 160.
49. See JACOB, supra note 32, at 50-51.
50. See Kay, supra note 33, at 292.
51. See Miller, supra note 46, at 162.
52. See Kay, supra note 33, at 299-300.
53. See id. at 299.
54. Id.
55. See Stuart A. Brody, California's Divorce Reform: Its Sociological Impli-
cations, 1 PAC. L.J. 223, 231 (1970) (referring to a statement made by Senator
Donald L. Grunsky, an author of the Family Law Act).
56. As one judge noted, "'You heard some stuff that really got your atten-
tion."' Miller, supra note 46, at 164 (quoting Judge Bill Hogoboom (retired)).
57. See JACOB, supra note 32, at 46-47.
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California's Family Law. Act of 1969 eliminated this need for tacking
a desire for divorce on some bad act or concealing mutual consent."
C. No-Fault and its Effect on Spousal Support
Apart from reforming divorce laws to reflect "the realities of
married life,"59 reformers also desired the creation of laws that as-
sessed the financial needs of divorced dependent spouses.' In a na-
tion with a history for granting support according to fault, California
became the first state to award spousal support based on each
spouse's needs and abilities.
Before the implementation of no-fault, divorce did little to alter
the financial bond between husband and wife. Fault-based divorce
law was rooted in gender-specific terms wherein the husband pro-
vided financial support and the wife furnished domestic support.61
For the most part, the law treated ex-spouses as if they remained
married; the law obligated a husband to provide for his wife during
marriage.62 In keeping with this idea, even after divorce, a husband
was often required to support his ex-wife either until death or re-
marriage if found at fault.6 Fault-based divorce supported itself on
the theory of obligation, an obligation stemming from both the social
status of women and laws promulgating their subservient role,' as
well as the notion that when a husband breaches a marital duty, his
punishment is the continued support of his ex-wife.6
Because the Family Law Act eliminated marital fault as the basis
for divorce, spousal support needed a new justification. Courts could
no longer punish a husband for breaching a marital duty by forcing
him to pay spousal support as compensation for divesting his wife of
58. See generally Family Law Act of 1969, 1969 Cal. Stat. 3312, 3323-30, ch.
1608, § 8, title 3 (repealed) (removing fault as the prerequisite for divorce).
59. Kay, supra note 33, at 299.
60. See id.
61. See Milton C. Regan, Jr., Spouses and Strangers: Divorce Obligations and
Property Rhetoric, 82 GEo. L.J. 2303,2311 (1994).
62 See Cynthia L. Greene, Alimony Is Not Forever: Self-Sufficiency and
Permanent Alimony, 4 J. AM. AcAD. MATRIMONIAL LAw. 9, 10 (1988).
Black's Law Dictionary defines alimony as "the sustenance or support of the
wife by her divorced husband and stems from the common-aw right of the wife
to support by her husband." BLACK'S LAW DICrIoNARY 73 (6th ed. 1990).
63. See Regan, supra note 61, at 2310.
64. Professor Kay mentions numerous laws subordinating women prior to
1970, including their inability to manage the family's earnings, property or assets,
as well as being prohibited from establishing credit in their own names. See Kay,
supra note 33, at 293-97.
65. See Regan, supra note 61, at 2310.
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her marital benefits." Rather than the contractual relationship em-
phasized in the fault-based divorce system, marriage is now perceived
as an economic partnership, a partnership based on the theory that
each spouse contributes "equally valuable resources toward the ac-
quisition of assets, and therefore is entitled to a portion of the fruits
of this labor."67 Stretching this metaphor to its logical conclusion,
upon dissolution of the partnership-here, dissolution of the mar-
riage-assets are divided to enable each spouse to go his or her sepa-
rate way. However, spousal support supplements accumulated assets
where necessary.
The concept of marriage as a partnership, coupled with women's
social and economic advancement, gave permanent alimony a nega-
tive connotation. More and more courts refused to award lifetime
support simply because two people chose to marry.' Previous arti-
cles discuss how some judges saw permanent alimony as giving wives
"a perpetual pension, 69 from their former husbands' income or fos-
tering a stereotype of "alimony drones."7 °
As permanent alimony fell out of favor, courts began awarding
transitional support, or rehabilitative alimony.7 This shift makes
sense in the context of no-fault divorce. Because self-sufficiency is
the goal, rehabilitative alimony provides support to enable a sup-
ported spouse to retrain or educate herself. Furthermore, rehabilita-
tive alimony recognizes both the contributions of the supported
spouse as well as the subsequent disadvantages he or she experienced
following divorce. Specifically, the Family Code requires judges to
consider a supported spouse's earning ability under section 4320(g).'
But, section 4320 subdivisions(a)(2),(b),(d), and (h)-which require a
court to consider such issues as contributions made by the supported
spouse to the other's career, the age and health of the supported
spouse, and the extent to which the supported spouse's ability to earn
66. See id. at 2313-14.
67. Id. at 2314.
68. See Greene, supra note 62, at 11.
69. Id. at 12 (citing In re Marriage of Brantner, 67 Cal. App. 3d 416, 420, 136
Cal. Rptr. 635, 637 (1977)).
70. Krauskopf, supra note 19, at 574.
71. See generally Green, supra note 62, at 11-14 (discussing the rehabilitative
alimony trend).
72. Section 4320(g) reads: "The ability of the supported party to engage in
gainful employment without unduly interfering with the interests of dependent




is hindered by her absence from the workforce-offset this element.7
Yet, rehabilitative alimony may be insufficient to meet the needs of
older homemakers in lengthy marriages.7 4 Most often, these women
gave up jobs and educational opportunities to become housewives
and mothers.
The common criticism of rehabilitative alimony is that, while it
may be sufficient for a younger wife to return to school or receive
additional training, this is not necessarily true for older wives.7 This
criticism stems mainly from the belief that rehabilitative alimony as-
sumes that a divorced woman can become self-sufficient. For exam-
ple, Lenore Weitzman argues that in awarding transitional support,
judges "overestimate the ease with which.., a housewife can find an
adequate job and become self-sufficient., 71 Weitzman's concern is
justified, and she makes an excellent suggestion for curbing inequities
that arise in applying the self-sufficiency standard. Because alimony
depends upon a supported spouse's earning potential, Weitzman sug-
gests judges take four factors into consideration when making sup-
port orders: (1) evaluate the supported spouse's salable skills and in-
terests; (2) assess the state of the job market for those particular
skills; (3) consider any additional training the supported spouse may
need to hone these skills; and (4) recognize the long-term benefits to
both parties when the supported spouse is engaged in a profitable
and rewarding career.n Weitzman's argument supports the current
practice of judges ordering vocational exams to determine a
73. The subdivisions state as follows:
(a)(2) The extent to which the supported party's present or future
earning capacity is impaired by periods of unemployment that were
incurred during the marriage to permit the supported party to devote
time to domestic duties.
(b) The extent to which the supported party contributed to the
attainment of an education, training, a career position, or a license by
the supporting party.
(d) The needs of each party based on the standard of living
established during the marriage.
(h) The age and health of the parties.
Id. § 4320(a)(2),(b),(d), & (h).
74. See Krauskopf, supra note 19, at 579.
75. See supra notes 68-69 and accompanying text.
76. LENORE J. WEITZMAN, THE DIVORCE REVOLUTION: THE UNEXPECTED
SOCIAL AND ECONOMIC CONSEQUENCES FOR WOMEN AND CHILDREN IN
AMERICA 165-66 (1985).
77. See id. at 206-08.
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supported spouse's needs and abilities pursuant to section 4331 .
Judges then consider the results of this exam in light of section
4320(a) (1).
71
III. THE LEGISLATIVE BATrLE
A. SB 509: Codification of a Public Policy Goal
During 1996 and 1997, the issue of self-sufficiency was hotly de-
bated among lawmakers in Sacramento. SB 509, which sought to
amend existing law to take into account the changing conditions of
divorce, initiated the debate. ° Self-sufficiency was the primary in-
tent."' According to data relied upon in SB 509, by 1992 80.3% of di-
vorced mothers were employed.' Bill sponsors wanted the law codi-
fied to reflect "the public policy of encouraging parties to rebuild
their lives and, within a reasonable length of time, to live self-
sufficiently and with independence from each other."' "
Enactment of SB 509 in 1996 affected the Family Code in two
areas. First, the bill expanded section 4320 to include two additional
factors that a court must consider in determining whether to award
78. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 4331 (West 1994). The statute states in pertinent
part:
(a) In a proceeding for the dissolution of marriage or for legal
separation of the parties, the court may order a party to submit to an
examination by a vocational counselor. The examination shall include
an assessment of the party's ability to obtain employment based upon
the party's age, health, education, marketable skills, employment
history, and the current availability of employment opportunities.
The focus of the examination shall be on an assessment of the party's
ability to obtain employment that would allow the party to maintain
herself or himself at the marital standard of living.
Id. § 4331(a).
79. Section 4320(a)(1) requires a court to consider "[t]he marketable skills of
the supported party; the job market for those skills; the time and expenses re-
quired for the supported party to acquire the appropriate education or training
to develop those skills; and the possible need for retraining or education to ac-
quire other, more marketable skills or employment." Id. § 4320(a)(1).
80. See JuNE 1996 REPORT ON SB 509, supra note 14, at 4.
81. Supporters of SB 509 argued that "[b]oth men and women find them-
selves supporting former spouses without any indication that the former spouse
will ever be self-supporting. In some instances, current law appears to discour-
age self-sufficiency and encourage dependency." Id.
82- See CALIFORNIA ASSEMBLY COMM. ON JUD., REPORT ON SB 509, JULY 5,
1995 HEARING, 1995-96 Reg. Sess. 2 (relying on data issued by the U.S. Dept. of
Labor, Bureau of Labor Statistics) [hereinafter JULY 1995 REPORT ON SB 509].
83. I& at 5.
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spousal support, subdivisions (j) and (k). Subdivision (j) directs
judges to consider the hardships to each party." Although section
4320's factors are measured in light of the marital standard of living,
subdivision (j) reflects the economic realities of maintaining two
households after divorce:
The standard of living enjoyed by a married couple is the
result of the couple's combined income (two-thirds of adult
women now work outside the home) flowing into a single
household. When the couple separates and two households
have to be maintained, there is clearly not enough money to
provide both parties with the marital standard of living."
While this example presupposes that both spouses are working, the
need for self-sufficiency in a single-income family is even more cru-
cial. Assuming that only the husband works, a single income main-
tains the family household. Upon divorce, if the husband still re-
mains the sole supporter, he now must maintain two households on a
budget previously used for one.
The need for self-sufficiency is even more significant if the hus-
band is not a high-income earner. Weitzman's study illustrates a di-
rect correlation between a housewife's alimony and her husband's in-
come." If there is not enough money to support both spouses, it
seems only just that a housewife make efforts to become self-
supporting. Or, where circumstances indicate an inability to be self-
sufficient, a wife should at least contribute something to her support.
For some, this position is overly harsh towards women who have
never worked-the displaced homemaker. But what is more draco-
nian: permitting a supported spouse to continue receiving alimony
without making a good faith effort towards self-sufficiency-at a
minimum to at least contribute to her support-simply because she
did not work in the past, or, requiring that a supporting spouse main-
tain two households on a single income? A balance must be struck
between husband and homemaker in the face of divorce. The 1996
Amendments codify this balance by protecting the supporting spouse
84. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 43200) (West Supp. 1998).
85. MAY 1997 REPORT ON AB 400, supra note 24, at 8. This statement was
made by opponents of AB 400.
86. See WErrZMAN, supra note 75, at 189. Weitzman's results are as follows:
64% of housewives who were married to men earning over $30,000 per year re-
ceived alimony, as opposed to 57% of housewives married to husbands earning
between $20,000-$29,000 and 17% of housewives whose husbands earned under
$20,000. See id. Though it should be noted that this study was conducted in the
1970s, the use of the data shows a correlation between alimony and income.
June 1998] 1399
LOYOLA OF LOS ANGELES LAW REVIEW [Vol.31:1387
from a supported spouse's lack of making a good faith effort towards
self-sufficiency-section 4330(b)-and by recognizing that not all
supported spouses will gain self-sufficiency within half the duration
of the marriage-section 4320.
Subdivision (k) was the second factor added to section 4320 un-
der the 1996 AmendmentsY This factor codifies the public policy
goal of self-sufficiency and gives an objective standard which requires
a supported spouse to demonstrate self-sufficiency within a reason-
able amount of time, or half the duration of the marriage.' This rea-
sonable time frame, however, must not be construed as an absolute
termination date; subdivision (k) should be treated like the remaining
provisions, and is not intended to preempt other factors necessary for
a just and equitable support order."
SB 509 also expanded section 4330 to require a self-sufficiency
admonition with every support order:
When making an order for spousal support, whether the
order is for a specific amount or simply a reservation of
jurisdiction, and except in the limited number of cases
where the court determines that a party is unable to make
such efforts, the court shall give the parties the following
admonition:
"It is the goal of this state that each party shall
make reasonable good faith efforts to become self-
supporting as provided for in Section 4320. The
failure to make reasonable good faith efforts, may
be one of the factors considered by the court as a
basis for modifying or terminating support. '
The admonition, commonly referred to as a "Gavron warning" after
In re Marriage of GavronY articulated the codified public policy goal
of section 4320(k).
Opposition to SB 509 centered mainly around the alleged puni-
tive effects of the self-sufficiency guidelines. Both the Family Law
Section of the State Bar and the Coalition for Family Equity (CFE),
which sponsored AB 400, criticized SB 509 as unnecessary, arguing
that the factors of section 4320 already provided an incentive for
87. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 4320(k) (West Supp. 1998).
88. See id.
89. See PRACrICE GUIDE, supra note 12, at 6-244.
90. CAL. FAM. CODE § 4330(b) (West Supp. 1998).
91. 203 Cal. App. 3d 705, 250 Cal. Rptr. 148 (1988).
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self-sufficiency. 92 CFE further claimed that homemakers and moth-
ers would be severely penalized given their general lack of employ-
able skills.93 The legislature disagreed, however, and enacted SB 509
in 1996.94
B. Protecting the Displaced Homemaker: The Goal of AB 400
Specifically addressing the changes of SB 509, the sponsors of
AB 400 asserted three issues: (1) that "self-supporting" refer to the
marital standard of living; (2) that marriages of long duration be
shielded from section 4320(k)'s self-support objective; and (3) that
section 4330's admonition be discretionary rather than required."
Supporters contended that SB 509 enacted anti-female legislation
that worked to punish and impoverish older homemakers.96
By codifying public policy in section 4320(k), supporters of AB
400 argued that courts would inappropriately employ a "rule of
thumb" measurement used in short-term marriages and apply it to
those of long duration.' The measurement, as applied to short-term
marriages, is that a supported party should receive spousal support
for up to half the length of the marriage, at which time the party must
become self-supporting." Dubbing subdivision (k) an "implied
threat,"'9 AB 400 supporters feared that the self-support guideline
would lead many divorcees of long-term marriages "out to pas-
ture,"' since they would generally be unable to meet this goal:
The sponsors of AB 400 contend that the new self-support
guideline, and the judicial admonition which reinforces it,
will compound the economic hardships already experienced
by many divorced women, particularly older homemakers
from long-term marriages and mothers with dependent
children .... Imposing an arbitrary cut-off date on support
payments is unnecessarily punitive and, in many cases,
unrealistic.'
92. See JULY 1995 REPORT ON SB 509, supra note 82, at 5-7.
93. See id. at 7.
94. See SB 509, 1995-96 Reg. Sess., 1996 Cal. Stat. ch. 1163, §§ 1-2.
95. See MAY 1997 REPORT ON AB 400, supra note 24, at 1.
96. See id at 7.
97. Telephone Interview, supra note 25.
9& See JuLY 1995 REPORT ON SB 509, supra note 82, at 4-5.
99. MAY 1997 REPORT ON AB 400, supra note 24, at 7.
100. Telephone Interview, supra note 25.
101. MAY 1997 REPORT OF AB 400, supra note 24, at 7.
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There are several difficulties with AB 400's position regarding
section 4320(k)'s self-sufficiency guideline and section 4330's admo-
nition. First, the rule of thumb measurement is just that, a rule of
thumb: it "is simply a baseline measurement; it is not a presump-
tively-correct timeframe toward the goal of self-sufficiency ....
Nowhere in the language of subdivision (k) are judges required to
automatically terminate spousal support for any marriage, regardless
of duration. In fact, the language emphasizes the exact opposite
view: "However, nothing in this section is intended to limit the
court's discretion to order support for a greater or lesser length of
time, based on any of the other factors listed in this section and the
circumstances of the parties."1°3 This sentence reveals that subdivi-
sion (k) does not impose an arbitrary termination date. Rather, it
reminds judges that subdivision (k) is just one factor, in a list of
many, that they must consider and weigh. Moreover, this phrase is
particularly important for long-term marriages, since section 4320(f)
covers duration."°4 There are eleven other factors a court must con-
sider, including the catch-all subdivision (1), which enables a court to
plug in any additional circumstances necessary for an equitable sup-
port order. 5 If a supported spouse is indeed incapable of self-
sufficiency, either within the objective time or at all, this will be con-
sidered, and failure to do so could be an abuse of discretion.
An additional problem with AB 400 is that it drew a bright line
for the statutory definition of a long-term marriage, which case law
demonstrates is flexible.' Section 4336 presumes that a long-term
marriage has a duration of more than ten years from the date of
marriage to the date of separation."' But, according to the language
of the statute, nothing prevents a court from deciding that a marriage
of less than ten years is one of long duration."'
102. PRACTICE GUIDE, supra note 12, at 6-244.
103. CAL. FAM. CODE § 4320(k) (West Supp. 1998).
104. See id. § 4320(f) (West 1994 & Supp. 1998).
105. See id. § 4320(I) (West Supp. 1998). Subdivision (1) allows a court to con-
sider "[a]ny other factors [it] determines are just and equitable." Id. According
to Hogoboom and King, this catch-all provision advances the Legislature's prin-
cipal goal that courts exercise direction in order to achieve a just and equitable
result in each case. See PRACrIcE GUIDE, supra note 12, at 6-245 to 6-246.
106. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Neal, 92 Cal. App. 3d 834, 846, 155 Cal. Rptr.
157, 164 (1979) (qualifying a seven year marriage as one of long duration); In re
Marriage of Heistermann, 234 Cal. App. 3d 1195, 1197, 286 Cal. Rptr. 127, 129
(1991) (applying the rule to an eight year marriage).




Supporters of AB 400 wanted long-term marriages insulated
from receiving the Gavron warning. The committee report states:
"this bill now revises the 'Gavron' provision in section 4330, no
longer requiring but granting the court discretion to warn. . . , taking
into account the particular circumstances considered by the court
pursuant to section 4320, except in a marriage of long duration. ' 9
Why should a middle-aged, college-educated female be exempted
from the self-sufficiency guideline simply because her marriage hap-
pens to be classified as one of long duration? Furthermore, if judges
are able to classify a marriage of seven years as long-term°---three
years less than the statutory presumption-what is to limit them from
reducing the duration even more? According to the United States
Census Bureau, the median duration of marriages has increased from
6.7 years in 1970 to 7.2 years in 1990."' By completely insulating
long-term marriages from ever receiving the self-sufficiency warning,
we would adopt an inflexible standard inconsistent with the public
policy goal.
Currently, courts control the application of subdivision (k)'s half
the duration of the marriage rule given the legislative intent of judi-
cial discretion. The legislature has a hands-off approach when it
comes to the factors of section 4320. Courts are required to consider
each factor, but they can weigh and balance according to the specific
circumstances of the case. If the rule was intended to set an absolute
termination date, then there would be no subdivision (k), but rather a
separate and distinct provision. Instead, the legislature added the
half-duration rule to section 4320, a section traditionally known for
its deference to courts. AB 400's position to exempt long-term mar-
riages eliminates this judicial discretion by chaining judges to a blan-
ket exception.
IV. DOES THE CURRENT LAW PROVIDE ADEQUATE SUPPORT?
Although over a dozen women's interest groups supported AB
400, and it passed in both the Senate and the Assembly,12 the bill
nonetheless failed to overturn the 1996 Amendments. On September
8, 1997, Governor Wilson vetoed the bill by stating:
109. MAY 1997 REPORT ON AB 400, supra note 24, at 5-6 (emphasis added).
110. See Neal, 92 Cal. App. 3d at 846, 155 Cal. Rptr. at 164.
111. See STATISTICAL ABSTRACT, supra note 6, at 105, No. 150.
112. On June 2, 1997, the Assembly voted 42-32 in favor of the bill while on
August 4, 1997, the Senate voted 21-17. See Complete Bill History, supra note
23, at 314.
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This bill assumes that [SB 509] require[s] the court to
automatically terminate spousal support payments after a
certain period of time, thereby creating economic hardships
for particular recipients. They do no such thing .... Self-
support within a reasonable period of time should be the
goal of the supported party, but that is only one factor,
among many others, to be considered by the court in
ordering spousal support. In every instance the court is
required to determine what is equitable based upon the
particular circumstances of the case."'
Thus, the question now is: Does existing law protect the displaced
homemaker? The following discussion addresses the concerns of AB
400 in light of existing law as amended by SB 509 in 1996.
A. The Factors of Section 4320114
1. Subdivision (a)
To begin, two of AB 400's concerns are addressed in the very
first subdivision of section 4320. Subsection (a) focuses on each
spouse's earning capacity and whether it "is sufficient to maintain the
standard of living established during the marriage," taking into con-
sideration such things as the spouse's skills and whether or not there
is a market for them. 5 First, proponents of AB 400 argue that
housewives will be denied adequate support because the combination
of sections 4320(k) and 4330(b) impose severe economic hardship on
a class of women already suffering from the financial effects of di-
vorce."' According to these groups, such women "are among the
most impoverished citizens in our state."".7 Yet, pursuant to section
4320(a), the court is required not only to look at the supported
spouse's earning ability but to consider it in light of the marital stan-
dard of living."' Note, though, that the marital standard of living is
not intended to set either a minimum or maximum amount for pur-
poses of spousal support."9 Thus, courts are free to order more or
113. Letter from Pete Wilson, supra note 31, at 54.
114. This Comment deals only with those section 4320 factors impacted by AB
400.
115. CAL. FAm. CODE § 4320(a) (West 1994 & Supp. 1998).
116. See MAY 1997 REPORT ON AB 400, supra note 24, at 7.
117. Id.
11& See CAL. FAM. CODE § 4320(a).




less support, depending on the remaining factors set out in the stat-
ute.
120
Therefore, while it may be true that a supported spouse could
support herself with a minimum wage job, the court is instead going
to measure this against the marital standard of living, with conces-
sions made for ability to earn and the hardships experienced by the
parties. But there is also a certain amount of reasonableness that fac-
tors into a court's determination of the marital standard of living. A
hypothetical in In re Marriage of Smith12 ' aptly illustrates this point:
[I]f during a marriage two spouses and their seven children
lived in a six-bedroom home, it would not be reasonable,
upon a dissolution long after the children were grown and
on their own, and the house sold, for the supported spouse
to contend he or she was entitled to sufficient support to
purchase a six-bedroom home in which he or she would live
alone."
A criticism of SB 509 voiced during committee hearings was that
displaced homemakers could not be expected to "'invent job qualifi-
cations they do not have.""2' Courts are, however, prohibited from
speculating as to the supported spouse's abilities. 4 Instead, as em-
phasized previously, courts can order that a supported spouse un-
dergo a vocational examination to enable them to make a proper as-
sessment of the supported spouse's abilities. Even one SB 509
opponent recognized the vocational exam as an important tool in as-
sisting judges in determining the feasibility of self-sufficiency.'2 The
court in In re Marriage of Baker," upheld a refusal to fix a termina-
tion because self-sufficiency could only be based on speculation."V
The facts indicated that, although the wife was employed, she was
unable to support herself at a standard similar to the one she enjoyed
while married."2 Moreover, the court was unable to ascertain at what
point her future earnings would render her self-sufficient. 29 Thus, a
court is not likely to set a spousal support termination date on the
120. See id. at 484,274 Cal. Rptr. at 919.
121. 225 Cal. App. 3d 469,274 Cal. Rptr. 911 (1990).
122. Id. at 490 n.12, 274 Cal. Rptr. at 923 n.12.
123. JULY 1995 REPORT ON SB 509, supra note 82, at 7.
124. See PRACrICE GUIDE, supra note 12, at 6-215.
125. See JULY 1995 REPORT ON SB 509, supra note 82, at 6-7.
126. 3 Cal. App. 4th 491,4 Cal. Rptr. 2d 553 (1992).
127. See id. at 498, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 557.
128. See id. at 498, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 556-57.
129. See id. at 499, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 557.
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grounds that the supported spouse will probably become self-
supporting in "X" amount of time.
AB 400 supporters also argue that by forcing the supported
spouse to become self-supporting, the legislature ignores the amount
of time that an older homemaker has been out of the work-force or
that many divorced women are not capable of achieving self-
sufficiency.m However, subdivision (a)(2) of section 4320 specifies
that, with regard to the supported spouse's earning capacity, courts
are to consider "[t]he extent to which the supported party's present
or future earning capacity is impaired by periods of unemployment
that were incurred during the marriage to permit the supported party
to devote time to domestic duties." ' Therefore, courts are required
to consider a homemaker's absence from the work force by recogniz-
ing possible impairment of earning capabilities due to domestic du-
ties."
2. Subdivision (b)
It is not uncommon for the supported spouse to have at one time
been the breadwinner of the family while the other spouse pursued a
degree or acquired additional vocational training.33 A concern is that
provision (k) bars the supported spouse from realizing the benefits of
her contribution to the other spouse's enhanced earning potential.
3
Section 4320(b), however, squarely addresses this issue in no uncer-
tain terms. It requires courts to consider "[t]he extent to which the
supported party contributed to the attainment of an education,
training, a career position, or a license by the supporting party."'35 If
the supported spouse in any way advanced the supporting spouse's
ability to increase his or her earning potential, the supported spouse
should realize this contribution via the court's application of section
4320(b).
130. See MAY 1997 REPORT ON AB 400, supra note 24, at 7.
131. CAL. FAM. CODE § 4320(a)(2) (West 1994 & Supp. 1998).
132. See In re Marriage of Smith & Ostler, 223 Cal. App. 3d 33, 49, 272 Cal.
Rptr. 560, 569-70 (1990) (holding that because the supported spouse had been a
homemaker for 21 years, she should be reimbursed for this absence from the
workplace).
133. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Watt, 214 Cal. App. 3d 340, 344, 262 Cal. Rptr.
783,785 (1989).
134. See DOROTHY JONAS & BONNIE SLOAN, COALITION FOR FAMILY
EQUITY, INFORMATION PACKET: ASSEMBLY BILL 400 (KuEHL), 3-4 (1997).
135. CAL. FAM. CODE § 4320(b) (West 1994 & Supp. 1998).
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An illustrative case is In re Marriage of Watt,136 where the appel-
late court overturned a lower court's refusal to weigh the wife's con-
tribution to her husband's education." Finding that the wife shoul-
dered approximately sixty-four percent of the family's living expenses
while her husband attended school," the appellate court held that in
"career-threshold marriage[s]" ' the nonstudent spouse's contribu-
tion warrants "weighty consideration by the trial court in deciding the
propriety and extent of a spousal support award."14 The appellate
court also chastised the lower court for its myopic application of sec-
tion 4320 because it did not recognize the peculiar facts of the case or
the need to apply section 4320 as a whole.141 In determining spousal
support, the lower court focused on the parties' actual standard of
living and ignored the fact that the parties deliberately lived on a stu-
dent budget with the expectation that the marital community would
benefit from the immediate sacrifices of both parties. 42 "Although
the phrase 'standard of living of the parties' perhaps at first glance
appears unambiguous," noted the appellate court, "courts should
look to the substance rather than the letter of the statute if absurd or
unjust results follow from a literal interpretation."' 43
3. Subdivision (c)
Even if spouses live on a student budget, courts have the ability
to consider future earnings under subdivision (c).'M It is important to
note that subdivision (b) is a companion provision to Family Code
section 2641, aptly titled "Community contributions to education or
training." 45 This section accounts for any loans a spouse may have
taken for training or education and requires reimbursement to the
community for any loan obtained during the marriage."4 The ration-
ale behind this policy is that, where one spouse works to enable the
136. 214 Cal. App. 3d 340,262 Cal. Rptr. 783 (1989).
137. See id. at 351, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 789.
138. See id. at 349, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 788.
139. Id. at 344, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 785.
140. Id. at 350, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 789.
141. See id. at 352,262 Cal. Rptr. at 790.
142. See id at 351-52,262 Cal. Rptr. at 789-90.
143. Id at 351-52, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 790.
144. Subdivision (c) reads: "The ability to pay of the supporting party, taking
into account the supporting party's earning capacity, earned and unearned in-
come, assets, and standard of living." CAL. FAM. CODE § 4320(c) (West 1994 &
Supp. 1998).
145. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 2641 (West 1994).
146. See id. § 2641(b)(2).
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other to receive an education or training in pursuit of a career, it is
usually with the expectation that the community will profit from such
a decision.147 In short, the working spouse, here the wife, should not
lose out when the marriage is dissolved prior to the realization of any
benefit, which the statute so provides.
As stated above, courts have the power to consider a supporting
spouse's ability to earn under section 4320(c).' Therefore, while
spousal support is typically based on the parties' respective present
incomes, a court may instead choose to look at the supporting
spouse's potential earnings. For example, in In re Marriage of Smith
& Ostler,1 4 9 the appellate court affirmed a spousal support order
awarding a wife fifteen percent of her husband's future bonuses."o
4. Subdivision (d)
Supporters of AB 400 contended that the recent amendments re-
sult in the further impoverishment of older divorced homemakers.'
Section 4320(d), however, expressly requires a court to consider the
needs of the supported spouse." 2 "Need" does not mean simply the
bare necessities of life;53 if so, a supported spouse accustomed to liv-
ing on a grand estate could receive just enough money to pay rent on
a studio. Rather, "'need' must also be judged in terms of the parties'
station in life during marriage and before separation.""4 There is,
however, nothing that requires a court to base need on the marital
standard of living.'55 Courts traditionally order support in an amount
necessary to enable the supported spouse to live at "substantially the
same standard of living enjoyed" during the marriage.'56 To suggest
147. See Marriage of Watt, 214 Cal. App. 3d at 352, 262 Cal. Rptr. at 790. The
court stated: "the parties consciously subjected themselves to a student standard
of living, on the expectation of future improvement for the community's benefit."
Id.
148. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 4320(c).
149. 223 Cal. App. 3d 33, 272 Cal. Rptr. 560 (1990).
150. See id. at 50, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 570-71 (holding that the trial court did not
abuse its discretion in awarding spousal support of $3,000 per month plus 15% of
the husband's annual gross cash bonus).
151. See MAY 1997 REPORT ON AB 400, supra note 24, at 7.
152. The subdivision states: "The needs of each party based on the standard of
living established during the marriage." CAL. FAM. CODE § 4320(d).
153. See PRACriCE GUIDE, supra note 12, at 6-234.
154. Id. (citation omitted).
155. See id.
156. Smith & Ostler, 223 Cal. App. 3d at 41, 272 Cal. Rptr. at 564. See also
Marriage of Baker, 3 Cal. App. 4th at 498, 4 Cal. Rptr. 2d at 557 (1992) (finding
that the wife was unable to generate an income anywhere near the lifestyle she
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that a supported spouse will receive exactly the same amount of sup-
port to continue carrying on in the same fashion as when married is
to ignore that, due to marital dissolution, there are now two house-
holds that the supporting spouse is responsible for-his or her own,
and his or her contribution to the supported spouse's household. It is
important to remember though, that "need" is just one factor consid-
ered by the court; a supported spouse's "need" must nevertheless be
weighed against the other section 4320 factors, including the ability to
earn and the age and health of the parties.
5. Subdivision (f)
A major argument in support of AB 400 was that section
4320(k)'s self-supporting directive denied long-term marriages re-
tention of jurisdiction pursuant to section 4336." Section 4336(a)
authorizes courts to retain jurisdiction indefinitely over marital disso-
lution proceedings involving marriages of long duration.5 ' Thus, ei-
ther party can walk into court years later for purposes of modifying
or terminating spousal support, whereas in short-term marriages the
court will typically order support for a finite period. Supporters ar-
gued that the objective measurement inherently includes both short
and long durational marriages, thereby creating a conflict between
sections 4320 and 4336.' Prior to the 1996 Amendments, courts
applied a rule of thumb durational measurement, similar to subdivi-
sion (k), to marriages of short duration.w AB 400 supporters con-
tended that subdivision (k) extends this rule beyond its scope by ap-
plying it to marriages of long duration.1
Section 4336 only applies to retention of jurisdiction, not to the
amount of support. Therefore, even if a supported spouse does be-
come self-sufficient, the court may retain jurisdiction in order to de-
termine the sustainability of her self-sufficiency. Moreover, section
4320(f) requires courts to consider marital duration for purposes of
determining the amount of support." There is a presumption that
marriages of long duration make a stronger case for retaining
enjoyed while married).
157. See MAY 1997 REPORT ON AB 400, supra note 24, at 1.
158. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 4336(a) (West 1994).
159. See Telephone Interview, supra note 25. See also MAY 1997 REPORT ON
AB 400, supra note 24, at 7 (stating that the purpose of the bill is to resolve con-
tradictions in the Family Code caused by the 1996 Amendments).
160. Telephone Interview, supra note 25.
161. See id
162. CAL. FAM. CODE § 4320(f) (West 1994 & Supp. 1998).
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jurisdiction over spousal support, whereas marriages of short dura-
tion do not necessarily incur all of the concerns expressed by AB 400
supporters." Yet, a rule of absolute exclusion would result in special
protection for all marriages of long duration, regardless of the cir-
cumstances.
6. Subdivision (g)
Section 4320(g) requires a court to consider "[t]he ability of the
supported party to engage in gainful employment without unduly in-
terfering with the interests of dependent children in the custody of
the party."' '64 While this Comment does not deal with child support
issues, it is worth noting that section 4320(g) does consider the self-
support guideline and its possible impact on a supported spouse's
child-rearing responsibilities. Moreover, the Smith & Ostler court
awarded the wife enough support to cover her household and child
care expenses while working towards her college degree.1 6 Though
she took care of the children during the marriage, staying at home
full-time would be impossible in the face of the self-support guide-
line. The court recognized this by stating: "[S]he is entitled to the
same accommodation-necessarily from outside sources-and such
help should be considered an expense of acquiring her training and
becoming a working mother.""
7. Subdivision (h)
Supporters of AB 400 are mainly concerned with women who
have spent the better portion of their lives as homemakers; they con-
tend that the public policy goal of self-sufficiency is "unnecessarily
punitive" towards these women.67 Yet, given that courts must con-
sider the age and health of the parties pursuant to section 4320(h),
requiring self-sufficiency when it plainly is not feasible to do so could
be deemed an abuse of discretion."6
While spousal support is entrenched in statutory language and
public policy concerns-as evidenced by the above factors- there is
an emerging desire to see spouses become self-sufficient and progress
163. Telephone Interview, supra note 25.
164. CAL. FAM. CODE § 4320(g).
165. Smith & Ostler, 223 Cal. App. 3d at 47,272 Cal. Rptr. at 568.
166. Id. (citation omitted).
167. See MAY 1997 REPORT ON AB 400, supra note 24, at 7.
168. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 4320(h).
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with their own lives.169 Section 4320(k) codifies this public policy
concern and deems "one-half the length of the marriage"'70 an ade-
quate yardstick for becoming self-sufficient. Nevertheless, because
marital dissolution cases are unique, the legislature gives the courts
broad discretion, in the final clause, by enabling courts to grant sup-
port for a greater or lesser time under any of the other enumerated
factors."' Governor Wilson's veto message further substantiates this
belief.'
For AB 400 supporters to argue that section 4320(k) gives
courts the authority to terminate jurisdiction over spousal support is-
sues in marriages of long duration is to assume that the remaining
factors of section 4320 and section 4336 are insignificant in the face of
the public policy goal. "[Cases involving lengthy marriages where
the supported spouse is not reasonably capable of self-support re-
main good law."'73 Thus, the fear that homemakers will be "put out
to pasture"' 74 is unwarranted in light of the protections of section
4320's factors.
B. The Gavron Warning of Section 4330(b)
The 1996 Amendments require courts to warn support recipients
of their obligation to become self-supporting. Furthermore, the fail-
ure to make reasonable, good faith efforts to become self-supporting
is an adequate change of circumstances for purposes of modifying or
terminating spousal support.'75 Supporters of AB 400 argued that
section 4330's admonition does two things. First, it requires judges to
give the self-sufficiency admonition to all marriages, thereby elimi-
nating their discretionary power.7 6 By threatening wives of long-term
marriages that support will be terminated unless they get a job, the
mandate makes self-sufficiency "the determining factor in support
awards."' 7 Second, the admonition removes an important procedural
169. See JULY 1995 REPORT ON SB 509, supra note 82, at 5.
170. CAL. FAM. CODE § 4320(k) (West Supp. 1998).
171. See id. The final clause of subdivision (k) reads: "However, nothing in
this section is intended to limit the court's discretion to order support for a
greater or lesser length of time, based on any of the other factors listed in this
section and the circumstances of the parties." Id.
172. See Letter from Pete Wilson, supra note 31, at 54.
173. PRACrICE GUIDE, supra note 12, at 6-245 (citations omitted).
174. Telephone Interview, supra note 25.
175. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 4330(b) (West Supp. 1998).
176. See MAY 1997 REPORT ON AB 400, supra note 24, at 5-6.
177. Id. at 7.
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safeguard that a motion for modification or termination be based on
a change of circumstances. 78
While judges are indeed required to give the Gavron warning,
they do so under a broad power. The phrase "the court shall give the
parties the following admonition"'79 is preceded by an exceptions
clause which addresses the very situation AB 400 supporters are con-
cerned with: "except in the limited number of cases where the court
determines that a party is unable to make such efforts ... ."o From
this clause it is clear that a judge still retains the discretionary power
to customize support awards. Though there is concern that self-
sufficiency is left undefined,18' when read in the context of other fam-
ily law provisions-particularly section 4320-the ambiguity is consis-
tent with the legislative intent to give courts broad power in making
just and equitable support orders in light of the parties' unique cir-
cumstances.
Before the implementation of the 1996 Amendments, either
spouse of a long-term marriage could petition the court for modifica-
tion or termination of spousal support based on a "change of circum-
stances. '' 2 For example, a supported spouse could argue that her ex-
husband's increased income constitutes a change of circumstances
warranting an increase in spousal support. Section 4330's admonition
now makes a supported party's lack of good faith efforts to become
self-supporting a change of circumstances. AB 400 supporters in-
sisted that this statutory alteration permits harassment litigation and
may force wives to accept inadequate support due to the cost of de-
fending themselves in court against allegations of bad faith.183 This
argument is shortsighted given the general legal impediment against
harassing and frivolous lawsuits. While the concern itself is justified,
California Code of Civil Procedure section 128.5 provides the desired
protection by requiring parties to bring motions in good faith and
with a reasonable basis1 4 The San Francisco Women's Lawyers
178. See id.
179. CAL. FAM. CODE § 4330(b).
180. Id.
181. See MAY 1997 REPORT ON AB 400, supra note 24, at 7-8.
182. CAL. FAM. CODE § 4336(c) (West 1994).
183. See MAY 1997 REPORT ON AB 400, supra note 24, at 7.
184. See CAL. CODE CIV. PROC. § 128.5 (West 1982 & Supp. 1998). The stat-
ute states in pertinent part:
(a) Every trial court may order a party ... to pay any reasonable
expenses, including attorney's fees, incurred by another party as a
result of bad-faith actions or tactics that are frivolous or solely
intended to cause delay.
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Association argued that the admonition allows for modification or
termination of spousal support based simply on a "failure to make ef-
forts to become self-supporting."'" Yet, the statute defines what
"efforts" constitute a change of circumstances: those made in bad
faith."' In essence, section 4330's admonition balances the equities.
This is a commendable rule, for why should one spouse be forced to
underwrite another spouse's lifestyle when that person deliberately
fails to become self-sufficient? This argument gains even more dra-
matic effect when one considers that a supporting party is prohibited
from willfully reducing his or her income as a means of avoiding
spousal support.' In light of AB 400's concern of harassment litiga-
tion, does it seem fair that a wife can bring her ex-husband-who has
deliberately reduced his income in order to avoid paying support-
into court and demand payment, but a husband is prohibited from
using his ex-wife's willful refusal to be self-supporting as a basis for
modifying or terminating support?
V. CONCLUSION
Codification of the public policy goal of self-sufficiency was not
an act by the legislature to penalize homemakers. Nor was it insensi-
tive maneuvering at their expense. Like the divorce reformers of the
1960s, supporters of SB 509 wanted the law to reflect contemporary
norms: to consider both women's increased participation in the
workforce as well as society's changing attitude toward spousal sup-
port.
The elimination of fault brought an array of changes to the di-
vorce system and thus spousal support needed a new justification.
Gone are the days of placing blame. In its place is a system of laws
created to address, not a moral right to spousal support, but the eco-
nomic needs and abilities of the parties-in effect, self-sufficiency.
The purpose of this Comment is not to alienate the displaced
homemaker, for this class of women do need to be protected. This
Comment illustrates that, although the law may encourage self-
sufficiency, it recognizes that not all homemakers will meet this
(b)(2) "Frivolous" means (A) totally and completely without merit or
(B) for the sole purpose of harassing an opposing party.
185. MAY 1997 REPORT ON AB 400, supra note 24, at 8.
186. See CAL. FAM. CODE § 4330(b) (West Supp. 1998).
187. See, e.g., In re Marriage of Sinks, 204 Cal. App. 3d 586, 594,251 Cal. Rptr.
379, 383-84 (1988) (finding that the husband retired early in order to avoid pay-
ing spousal support).
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objective within the timeframe provided. However, half the duration
of the marriage is not an automatic rule, but merely a general stan-
dard seen as the most effective way of carrying out the public policy
goal. Some women will be capable of self-support within half the du-
ration, while others will not. But the law does not mandate auto-
matic termination. Courts are required to consider all circumstances
of the parties and failure to do so could constitute an abuse of discre-
tion.
Supporters of AB 400 rallied for complete isolation of long-term
marriages from receiving the Gavron warning. Statistics show that
the length of marriages is increasing. As a result, more and more
contemporary marriages would qualify for long-term marriage pro-
tection under AB 400. Such an absolute standard would shield more
than just the working husband/housewife marriage that persisted in
the past. Adopting such an inflexible rule is inconsistent with an oth-
erwise commendable public policy goal.
Nicole M. Catanzarite*
* Special thanks to the editors and staff of the Loyola of Los Angeles Law
Review for their hard work in pulling this piece together; Professor Goldberg, for
her constructive comments; and Joanne Schulman, the Senate Floor Analysis,
and the offices of Speaker pro Tempore Shelia James Kuehl and Senator Cal-
deron, for their invaluable assistance. Finally, this Comment is dedicated to my
friends, for their patience and understanding, and to my family, for their unwav-
ering support in light of my constant absence from the dinner table.
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